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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26 (b)(1)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal 
case may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final 
judgment of conviction of anything other than a first degree or 
capital felony. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Belt entrapped as a matter of law? 
2. Did the trial court err when it failed to grant Mr. 
Belt's motion for a mistrial after the jury heard the charge of Mr. 
Belt's offer to sell a controlled substance when the State presented 
no evidence on the charge? 
3. Was Mr. Belt erroneously convicted on insufficient 
evidence? 
v. 
TEXT OP STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann, §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) provides: 
Entrapment (1) It is a defense that the actor 
was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
co-operation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not otherwise 
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a 
person an opportunity to commit an offense does 
not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be 
unavailable when causing or threatening bodily 
injury is an element of the offense charged and 
the prosecution is based on conduct causing or 
threatening the injury to a person other than 
the person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is 
available even though the actor denies 
commission of the conduct charged to constitute 
the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the 
court shall hear evidence on the issue and 
shall determine as a matter of fact and law 
whether the defendant was entrapped to commit 
the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made 
at least ten days before trial except the court 
for good cause shown may permit a later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the 
defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the 
case with prejudice, but if the court 
determines the defendant was not entrapped, 
such issue may be presented by the defendant to 
the jury at trial. Any order by the court 
dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be 
appealable by the state. 
VI. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury 
where the defense of entrapment is an issue, 
past offenses of the defendant shall not be 
admitted except that in a trial where the 
defendant testifies he may be asked of his past 
convictions for felonies and any testimony 
given by the defendant at a hearing on 
entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony 
at trial. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended) provides in 
pertinent part: 
Receiving stolen property — (1) A person 
commits theft if he receives, retains, or 
disposes of the property of another knowing 
that it has been stolen, or believing that it 
probably has been stolen, or who conceals, 
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, 
selling, or withholding any such property from 
the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for 
paragraph (1) is presumed in the case of an 
actor who: 
(a) Is found in possession or control of 
other property stolen on a separate 
occasion; or 
(b) Has received other stolen property 
within the year preceding the receiving 
offense charged; or 
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort 
received, retained, or disposed, acquires it 
for a consideration which he knows is far 
below its reasonable value. 
vn. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : 
LYNN L. BELT, : Case No. 880169-CA 
Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A jury convicted the appellant, Lynn L. Belt, of two 
counts of Theft by Receiving, second and third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended) on October 
15, 1987. Mr. Belt appeals from a judgment and conviction for these 
crimes in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Some time in June, 1986, at Dee's Family Restaurant, 
located at 2100 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Officer Illsley 
left the phone area and approached Lynn Belt who was standing near 
the counter. Illsley commented to Mr. Belt that "he wished Galen 
would get a phone, it was hard to get hold of him." Although an 
acquaintance of "Galen," Mr. Belt did not respond to Illsley's 
comment (T. 9). Prior to this encounter, Mr. Belt testified that he 
had first seen Illsley at the West Valley City Police Department and 
was under the impression that Illsley was a police officer 
(Mr. Rod Lackau, an acquaintance of Mr. Belt, testified that Mr.Belt 
had told him that Illsley was a police officer with a friend who 
worked on the dock (T. 158)). Mr. Belt also saw Illsley at Dee's 
eating a few times and Illsley had said "hi" to him a few times 
before (T. 207-08) . 
As a sergeant in the Metro Major Felony Unit of the Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force, Officer Illsley was on undercover assignment 
(T. 6). His operation targeted certain people and one of those 
people was Mr. Belt (T. 14, 77). Thus, Illsley purchased three 
five-inch portable television sets at Skagg's Alpha Beta in West 
Valley City for $301 with the specific intent to offer them for sale 
to Mr. Belt (T. 10, 14). Officer Illsley cut the serial numbers, 
store name, and other information from the T.V. boxes and placed 
them in his 1977 blue Camaro before driving to Dee's Family 
Restaurant at 5:40 p.m. on the eighth of July, 1986 (T. 11, 14). 
While at Dee's, Officer Illsley observed Belt and another 
individual in the northeast corner of the parking lot standing next 
to Mr. Belt's semi-truck (T. 10, 15). Illsley drove alongside the 
truck, called "Lynn," and asked him to come over to his car 
(T. 209). Illsley asked Belt if he would be seeing Galen later. 
Belt replied that he saw Galen every day. Illsley then proceeded to 
uncover the T.V. sets under the blanket and stated, "Tell Galen I 
have these." (T. 16). Mr. Belt asked him how much he was asking 
for the sets. Illsley said "one bill" to which Mr. Belt responded 
that he could "get them in the store for less than that." Illsley 
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then answered that he meant one bill for all three of them (T. 17, 
193). Illsley testified he knew similar T.V.s could be purchased 
for $50 and even less. He was also aware T.V.s could be bought for 
ridiculously low prices at swap meets (T. 76). Officer Illsley 
further testified he did not tell Mr. Belt that the T.V.s were 
stolen (T. 81). 
Testimony differs as to the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. Officer Illsley testified there was no conversation 
about where the T.V.s came from and further that he did not 
volunteer the information (T. 83). Mr. Belt testified he inquired 
about the origin of the sets and asked Officer Illsley, "How come 
the name of the store was cut off the box?" Mr. Belt said Illsley 
responded "oh, they cut that off because a friend of mine works on 
the dock, and they cut it off so that you can't take it back and get 
a full refund of your money" (T. 193). Mr. Belt's wife and 
daughter, seated in the car waiting for Mr. Belt to end his 
conversation with Mr. Illsley, each testified that when Mr. Belt 
asked his wife for $100 to buy three small televisions he told them 
that they were overage from the dock (T. 126, 136). 
Illsley testified he pointed to the boxes and told Mr. 
Belt he had "peeled the serial numbers off. There won't be a hassle 
on it." Illsley testified Mr. Belt said he would "s can them 
. . . ." (T. 18). However, the serial numbers were not removed 
from the T.V. sets themselves (T. 84). And as Officer Illsley 
testified, peeling the serial number off the box does not solve the 
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problem of dealing in stolen property because police can still check 
the serial number on the set. Illsley also stated Mr. Belt did not 
ask him to remove the serial numbers from the sets themselves (T. 
85-87). In fact, no serial numbers were ever removed from any of 
the products purchased by Mr. Belt from Officer Illsley (T. 85). 
The following day, July 9th, Mr Belt discussed the 
situation with Jerry Hobbs, a recently retired sergeant from the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's office. Mr. Belt inquired about having 
one of Mr. Hobb's friends in the sheriff's office run a National 
Crime Information Center, or "NCIC" check on the televisions' serial 
numbers (T. 114, 194). Jerry Hobbs verified he was contacted by Mr. 
Belt in June or July of 1986 and was told that Mr. Belt had the 
opportunity to buy a "television set or two" and wanted him to check 
to see if the sets could be stolen (T. 118). Mr. Hobbs said that he 
never heard back from Mr. Belt (T. 118). 
However, Mr. Belt testified he did not follow through 
with Mr. Hobbs because the next day Kenny Wheeler told him that an 
NCIC check on the T.V. he purchased from Mr. Belt had been negative 
(T. 195). Mr. Wheeler was dating Mr. Belt's daughter and for thirty 
three dollars purchased one of the three sets obtained from Mr. 
Illsley for the same price. On his way home from Mr.Belt's home, 
Wheeler was stopped by the Lehi police who called in the serial 
number of the set and then released Wheeler. Worried, Mr. Wheeler 
had another officer in Lehi, Cory Healey, run an NCIC check on the 
television. This NCIC check also proved negative (T. 145-47, 153). 
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Mr. Wheeler conveyed this information to Mr. Belt on the 10th of 
July, indicating his television had not been reported stolen (T. 
146). 
The next contact between Mr. Belt and Officer Illsley 
occurred at Dee's on July 18th at 10:00 p*m. Earlier in the day, 
Illsley purchased a VHF video recorder at Silo in Sandy for $299.00 
(T. 21). He placed the video recorder in his car trunk and later 
arrived at Dee's at 9:30 p.m. (T. 20-22). Within a half hour of his 
arrival, Illsley saw Belt leaving the restaurant with some friends. 
Illsley followed them outside and after Belt separated from some of 
the individuals, he called to Belt and asked if he had a minute. He 
told Belt that he had a video recorder and Mr. Belt asked how much 
it would cost. Illsley said $100. Mr. Belt asked if it were a good 
one and Illsley said it was brand new (T. 23). Mr. Belt and Mr. 
Illsley then each proceeded to their cars. Mr. Belt, with Richard 
Jewkes in his car, pulled alongside Illsley's car in the parking 
lot. Illsley opened his trunk and showed the box to Mr. Belt and, 
according to Illsley, told him "I got it off a truck and there 
wouldn't be a problem with it." (T. 24). Mr. Belt made no response 
and paid $100 for the VCR (T. 25). Then Illsley said he had three 
more VCRs in boxes and asked if Mr. Belt were interested. Belt said 
to call him, ending the conversation (T. 25, 200). 
Illsley testified that after several phone calls, he made 
contact with Mr. Belt and arranged to meet him for coffee on the 
20th of July at 10:00 p.m. Illsley was fitted with a wireless 
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transmitter and had placed in his car three VCRs which he purchased 
on the 19th. Illsley paid between $1200 and $1300 for the VCRs. 
Serial numbers, model numbers and store identification had been 
removed from the boxes (T. 27-32). Mr. Belt was outside waiting 
when Illsley arrived. Illsley suggested they go to the back of the 
parking lot which Mr. Belt described as "very dark." Belt testified 
he was concerned why Illsley wanted him back in the dark corner of 
the lot. He had also seen a gun Illsley kept in his back pocket (T. 
201). Mr. Illsley verified he had "on occasion" carried a Beretta 
25 caliber pistol in his back pocket (T. 231). Because of his 
concern, Mr. Belt asked Mr. Illsley to follow him six blocks to a 
well-lit parking lot at Deseret Industries (T. 201). Officer 
Illsley testified that after arriving at the parking lot in front of 
Deseret Industries, Mr. Belt told him "I checked you out with 
Galen." "If you weren't a friend of Galen's, I wouldn't even be 
talking to you" and that there "wouldn't be any heat ever on 
anything." (T. 39-40). Mr. Belt paid $300 for the three video 
recorders (T. 37). Mr. Belt testified further that Officer Illsley 
asked if there were anything in particular that would come off an 
electronics dock that Mr. Belt would be interested in. Mr. Belt 
answered in the affirmative saying that a brother wanted a T.V. and 
he wanted a video camera (T. 221). 
On July 23, Officer Illsley next spoke to Mr. Belt (T. 
42, 203-04). Illsley called Mr. Belt and asked for Mr. Belt to 
return his call. When Belt called, Illsley asked if he were calling 
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from a pay phone. Belt responded no. Illsley asked him to call 
from a pay phone. Belt called from a pay phone at Dee's since he 
was going there anyway. Illsley invited him to his house 
(T. 203-04/ 219). The house was used for undercover operations and 
was equipped with a microphone, video camera and T.V. monitor 
(T. 44). 
Mr. Belt entered the house at 10:00 p.m. (T. 45). 
Officer Illsley testified that Mr. Belt was reluctant or paranoid at 
the undercover house. Illsley indicated numerous times that 
everything was "okay/1 everything was "checked-out" and that there 
would be "no problems." Illsley testified these assurances were 
part of his effort to build his own credibility as a crook and were 
not made to sell the equipment (T. 66-67). Mr. Belt testified 
Illsley was acting "screwy and squirrelly" at the undercover house. 
Mr. Belt asked where the T.V. came from and asked whether it was 
"boosted." Mr. Belt decided that if there were something wrong he 
could get in trouble so he told Illsley he did not want to know 
where it came from (T. 205). Illsley reassured Mr. Belt, "I didn't 
boost it, it's off the dock." (T. 207). Mr. Belt eventually 
purchased the T.V. for $100 (T. 52). | 
During the course of the trial Illsley testified he and 
Mr. Belt had a conversation regarding "crank," a street name for 
methamphetamine (T. 54). Illsley also testified that in response to 
Illsley's requests for crank, Mr. Belt said he "had a guy who was 
looking at crank." (T. 57). According to Illsley, Mr. Belt quoted 
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prices for specific amounts. id. In a subsequent telephone 
conversation, Illsley testified Mr. Belt indicated "the deal . . . 
is off.11 (T. 59). There were no other conversations regarding 
crank. Id. 
Mr. Belt was charged in Count I, Theft by Receiving for 
purchase of the three black and white televisions on or about July 
8, 1986. The jury found him not guilty of this Count. He was also 
charged in Count II with Theft by Receiving for purchasing the 
single VCR on or about July 8, 1986, and similarly found not guilty 
on this Count. The jury convicted him of Count III, Theft by 
Receiving for the three VCRs purchased on or about July 20, 1986 and 
of Count IV, Theft by Receiving for the nineteen inch television 
purchased on or about July 23, 1986. The trial court dismissed 
Count Vf Offering, Agreeing or Arranging to Distribute for Value a 
Controlled Substance, on motion of the defense for insufficient 
evidence after the State's case in chief (T. 113). 
Subsequent to the dismissal of Count V, defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial on the grounds Mr. Belt was denied a fair trial 
once the jury became tainted by hearing an allegation of and 
testimony about a crime the State could not prove. His motion was 
denied (T. 113). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, the conduct and methods employed by Sergeant 
Illsley in procuring the sale of items to Mr. Belt that would 
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result in a criminal conviction constituted entrapment as defined by 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) and Utah case law. 
Mr. Belt was induced by Sergeant Illsley to believe that 
the sales and purchases of a T.V. and three VCRs were not prohibited 
by the law. Furthermore/ Sergeant Illsley1s behavior was 
overreaching in luring the specific target/ Mr. Belt/ into the 
commission of a crime. 
Secondly, the trial court erred by not declaring a 
mistrial after it dismissed the charge against Mr. Belt of offering 
to sell a controlled substance following the State's case in chief 
during which a discussion about crank was the only evidence 
presented. The presentation of that evidence had as a purpose the 
casting of Mr. Belt as a person of evil character with the 
propensity to commit crime and that he was thus likely to have 
committed the crimes for which he was convicted, contrary to the 
trial standards laid down by Utah case law. The tactics which 
originally followed introduction of the evidence had as a result the 
circumvention of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Third/ evidence presented was insufficient to convict Mr. 
Belt of two counts of theft by receiving. The State failed to 
present sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Belt knew or believed 
the property had probably been stolen as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-408. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR, BELT WAS ENTRAPPED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) codifies the 
defense of entrapment. Mr. Belt filed the appropriate Entrapment 
Motion (Addendum A). The statute provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) . . . . Entrapment occurs when a law 
enforcement officer . . . induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not otherwise 
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a 
person an opportunity to commit an offense does 
not constitute entrapment. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 
(Utah 1979) reversed the defendant's conviction and clarified the 
Utah standard for establishing entrapment. The Court indicated an 
objective standard of assessing the police conduct would henceforth 
control entrapment law in Utah. Rather than focus on the 
"propensities and predispositions" of a specific defendant, analysis 
would focus instead on whether police conduct fell below certain 
"standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of 
governmental power." Id. at 500 referring to Hampton v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 484, 496-97, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed. 2d 113 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). A reviewing court should consider 
whether the conduct of the government in any given case "comport[s] 
with a fair and honorable administration of justicef.] . . ." State 
v. Taylor, at 500. Although the government cannot engage in 
"manufacture of crime," the government can present opportunity for 
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the commission of crime. Id. Likewise, government agents cannot 
lure a person into the commission of a crime. Id. 
In Taylor, the Court closely examined the issue of the 
past conduct of the accused and spe.cif ically rejected focusing on 
"propensities and predispositions" of the accused when it declined 
to adopt a subjective analysis for the defense of entrapment. The 
Court stated: 
No matter what the defendant's past record and 
present inclinations to criminality, or the 
depths to which he has sunk in the estimation 
of society, certain police conduct to ensnare 
him into further crime is not to be tolerated 
by an advanced society. 
Id. at 502. 
According to the Court in Taylor, Utah's entrapment 
statute closely parallels language of the Model Penal Code 1962 
Proposed Official Draft. That provision stated in part: 
(1) A public law enforcement official . . . 
perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of 
obtaining evidence of the commission of an 
offense, he induces or encourages another 
person to engage in conduct constituting such 
offense by either: 
(a) making knowingly fallse 
representations designed to induce the 
belief that such conduct is not 
prohibited; . . . 
State v. Taylor, at 502. 
The late Justice Maughan's dissent in State v. Bridwell, 
566 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 1977) articulated the objective standard 
for judging entrapment before it became the law in Utah. He noted 
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the defense of entrapment was to promote a social policy and quoted 
from the Model Penal Code Tentative Draft No. 9, §2.10, p.15 (1959): 
It is consistent with [preventing men from 
engaging in socially harmful conduct] to 
recognize a defense based upon those unsavory 
police methods which have the effect of 
fostering criminality. 
State v. Bridwell at 1236, Maughan, J., dissenting. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction in State 
v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984) because it found the offense 
had been induced by persistent requests by the officers. As noted 
in Taylor, luring someone into the commission of an offense will not 
be tolerated. 
In State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court again examined police behavior and found it had been 
overreaching. In that case, the undercover officer sold jewelry to 
the defendant as part of a sting operation. She represented the 
jewelry as not being stolen. She also said she was a divorced woman 
supporting six children who tutored math and gave piano lessons. 
Kaufman, at 466. At another meeting with the defendant after the 
defendant tried to establish a more intimate relationship with her, 
she told him the jewelry she had previously sold to him was stolen 
property. Id. at 467. Kaufman, however, did not report the 
incident to the police. I_d. Despite Kaufman's conduct in not going 
to the police once he knew the jewelry was stolen, his convictions 
for receiving stolen property were reversed. The Court reasoned the 
undercover officer was not only selling stolen merchandise, she was 
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also selling herself as an "attractive, relatively young, divorced 
mother of six children who was having hard times." Kaufman, at 468. 
In the case at bar, the police were also conducting a 
sting operation. No property was stolen because Officer Illsley had 
purchased the three televisions from a store in West Valley City 
(T. 10). Likewise, Illsley had purchased the video recorder at a 
store in Sandy (T. 20-21). The televisions were specifically bought 
with the intent to sell them to Mr. Belt (T. 77). Because Mr. Belt 
was somewhat wary of Officer Illsley1s conduct, he attempted to 
ascertain whether the goods might have been stolen. In particular, 
Mr. Belt was concerned because the serial numbers had been removed 
from the boxes (T. 60). Officer Illsley also testified Mr. Belt 
asked Illsley to leave the serial numbers on the box and "just kind 
of scrape the store names off so you can't read it." Ij3. Mr. Belt 
testified he believed the store names had been cut off the boxes to 
prevent the owner from exchanging these items at the stores for full 
value (T. 193). 
When Mr. Belt first examined the VCR in Illsley's trunk, 
he was told by Illsley it had been removed from a truck and there 
would not be a problem with it (T. 24). Once he was assured by 
Illsley the goods were not stolen, Mr. Belt paid $100 for the 
merchandise (T. 25). Illsley himself recognized similar televisions 
could be purchased for fifty or sixty dollars or even less at swap 
meets (T. 76). 
At a subsequent meeting with Illsley during which Illsley 
sold three VCRs to Mr. Belt, Mr. Belt indicated he had no preference 
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for removing warranty cards and serial numbers in response to 
lllsley's descriptions of what various other customers wanted (T. 
38). Illsley told Mr, Belt there would not be any heat ever, on 
anything (T. 40). Illsley represented the equipment as "overages" 
off the dock and further indicated the surpluses were such that 
"they [wouldn't] even know it was missing/' and again indicated 
there "wouldn't be any heat." (T. 60).* 
Illsley never did say the merchandise was stolen 
(T. 81). In fact, when Mr. Belt specifically suggested the items 
might be "boosted," Illsley denied the items were "boosted." 
(T. 100). To Mr. Belt, "boosted" meant stolen (T. 206). To 
Illsley, the term "boosted" is limited to shoplifting (T. 101). 
Although Mr. Belt told Illsley he really did not want to 
know the origins of the goods (T. 60, 205) and again expressed 
concern the items might be boosted, Illsley interrupted him and 
assured him there would not be any heat (T. 60, 206). Illsley never 
volunteered any information about where the items came from except 
that the items came off the dock (T. 83, 206). Another indication 
to Mr. Belt that the items were not stolen was lllsley's failure to 
remove the serial numbers from the television sets. Mr. Belt knew 
peeling the serial numbers off the boxes would not solve the problem 
if the goods were stolen (T. 85-87). Mr. Belt contacted 
1
 Although Illsley denied having told Mr. Belt the 
televisions or VCRs were overages, (T. 230) that information could 
not be verified from the tapes which were intact. 
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Jerry Hobbs, an employee recently retired after twenty-seven years 
with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office to have him check to see 
if the televisions might be stolen, but Mr. Hobbs never followed 
through (T. 118). Mr. Belt was not too concerned about getting back 
to Hobbs because Mr. Wheeler had already checked the sets (T. 194). 
Kenny Wheeler, who purchased one of the televisions from Mr. Belt, 
was pulled over in Lehi (T. 147). Although the police ran a check 
on the set in his car on the NCIC computer, the results of the check 
were negative (T. 153). 
Two others who bought the goods from Mr.Belt also 
testified at trial. Jay Price had been told the five-inch 
television, the VCR and the nineteen inch television were "overages 
off the dock." (T. 174). He, too, thought the names and addresses 
of the stores had been removed to prevent return of the items to the 
stores for refunds (T. 175). Doyle Harris was told by Mr. Belt he 
could get a VCR for $100. When Mr. Harris asked if the item were 
stolen, Mr. Belt said "No. The serial number is right on there." 
(T. 185). Mr. Harris was told the price was low because the item 
might be a second or damaged (T. 184). 
It is significant that Mr. Belt made no profit on the 
items he purchased and resold (T. 169, 173, 203, 206). It is also 
significant that Illsley persisted in making phone calls to 
Mr. Belt. According to Illsley1s records, seventeen phone calls 
were made, sixteen of which were recorded (T. 92). Fourteen of the 
sixteen calls were initiated by Illsley (T. 94). Mr. Belt often 
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told his family members to say he was not home when Illsley called 
(T. 127-78, 138). 
In the case at bar, Illsley's conduct fell below a level 
that our society should tolerate* Illsley misled Mr. Belt into 
believing the property was not stolen because he said it was not 
boosted. Illsley contacted Mr. Belt time and time again and 
Mr. Belt only called Illsley a few times to return phone calls. 
Although Mr. Belt was somewhat wary of the low prices Illsley 
presented, he believed he was simply dealing with surplus goods. 
Mr. Belt simply bought and resold the items. For these reasons, Mr. 
Belt was entrapped into committing a crime and his convictions 
should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DECLARE A 
MISTRIAL AFTER IT DISMISSED THE CHARGE OF 
OFFERING TO SELL A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOLLOWING THE STATE'S 
CASE IN CHIEF. 
Mr. Belt was charged in Count V with Offering, Agreeing 
or Arranging to Distribute for Value a Controlled Substance. The 
State's only evidence pertaining to this charge related to a 
conversation between Mr. Illsley and Mr. Belt. Mr. Illsley 
requested Mr. Belt to find some "crank" and Mr. Belt supposedly 
quoted prices but then indicated the deal was off (T. 54, 57, 59). 
The trial court dismissed the charge for insufficient evidence on 
defense counsel's motion following the State's case in chief 
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(T. 113). However, the court then refused to grant a motion for a 
mistrial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed a longstanding policy 
of limiting admission of evidence of other crimes allegedly 
committed by the accused "if the purpose is to disgrace the 
defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity to commit 
crime and thus likely to have committed the crime charged." State 
v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978)(footnote omitted). In 
Daniels, the Court found the challenged admission that the defendant 
had siphoned gas was relevant, and therefore properly admitted, to 
explain circumstances surrounding his lack of money and his motive 
for theft, the crime he was accused and convicted of. 
Again in State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984), the 
Supreme Court examined a similar issue and reversed the conviction 
because of the erroneous and prejudicial admission of another 
crime. In that case, two men stole a car. While in the car, the 
driver committed a robbery by pointing a gun at someone and forcing 
him to get in the car and hand over his money. The State contended 
the crime was relevant to show both possession of the car and 
cooperation in that possession between the driver and Holder. 
Although the Court found evidence of the robbery was relevant, it 
also found the evidence was merely cumulative on the issue of 
possession and cooperation. Therefore evidence of the robbery 
carried limited value when weighed against the "substantial 
possibility that [the] jury would be prejudiced . . . ." 694 P.2d at 
584. 
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In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the 
Supreme Court again reversed a conviction because the trial court 
erroneously denied a motion to sever and evidence of a prior 
conviction, admissible to prove a firearm charge was prejudicial to 
the defendant on the burglary charge. Such evidence is presumed 
prejudicial and "absent a reason for the admission of the evidence 
other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded." 
699 P.2d at 741. Limitations on admissibility of other crimes is 
needed to protect the accused from the possibility of basing a 
conviction on bad character rather than on a showing of evidence to 
support guilt on the crime charged. Id. The Court noted the Rules 
of Evidence are designed to protect against such undue prejudice. 
Id. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
In the instant case, the discussion about crank was the 
only evidence proferred by the State to support the charge of 
Offering, Agreeing or Arranging to Distribute for Value a Controlled 
Substance (T. 54-59). The State could not, therefore, prove the 
elements of the offense which would have required proof of an actual 
offer or agreement to obtain a controlled substance for value. Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(IV) (1953 as amended). Instead, the State 
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only utilized the evidence to infer Mr. Belt was a "bad character" 
and had a propensity for criminal activity. Such an inference of a 
criminal disposition was particularly prejudicial in the instant 
case because Mr. Belt's credibility in portraying to the jury he did 
not believe the property was stolen was paramount. 
The introduction of evidence under the guise that it 
could substantiate the specific crime charged was a tactic employed 
by the State to circumvent Rule 404(b). It was a tactic that 
allowed the State to introduce evidence which directly inferred 
Mr. Belt had a criminal disposition rather than prove guilt on the 
underlying charge. There was no legitimate reason for the State to 
elicit the testimony. 
Absent this error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
Mr. Belt would not have been convicted. Therefore, under the 
rationale of Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Mr. Belt's 
convictions should be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
MR. BELT OF TWO COUNTS OF THEFT BY RECEIVING. 
Mr. Belt was found guilty following his jury trial of 
Count III, Theft by Receiving, a second degree felony in that on or 
about July 20, 1986, he received the property of another, (three 
VCR's) believing that the property had probably been stolen, with a 
purpose to deprive the owner and the value of the property exceeded 
$1,000.00. He was also convicted on Count IV, Theft by Receiving, a 
- 19 -
third degree felony m that on or about July 23, 1986, he received 
property of another (a nineteen inch television) believing that the 
property had probably been stolen, with a purpose to deprive the 
owner thereof and that value of the property was more than $250,00 
but less than $1,000.00. 
The relevant portion of Utah's Theft by Receiving statute 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, 
retains, or disposes of the property of another 
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing 
that it probably has been stolen, or who 
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in 
concealing, selling, or withholding any such 
property to be stolen, with a purpose to 
deprive the owner thereof. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for 
paragraph (1) is presumed in the case of an 
actor who: 
(a) Is found in possession or control of 
other property stolen on a separate 
occasion, or 
(b) Has received other stolen property 
within the year preceding the receiving 
offense charged; or 
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort 
received, retained, or disposed, acquires it 
for a consideration which he knows is far 
below its reasonable value. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended). Utah's legislature has 
indicated the mental state required for the commission of an offense 
in Utah Code Ann. §76-2-101 (1953 as amended) That section states: 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his 
conduct is prohibited by law and: 
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(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with respect to each element 
of the offense as the definition of the 
offense requires, . . . . 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983) set forth the standard for reversing a criminal 
conviction on insufficient evidence: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
Id. at 444 (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar the State failed to prove Mr. Belt 
knew or believed the property probably had been stolen as required 
by Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408. None of the categories of subsection 
two (2) of the statute applies to Mr. Belt because he was neither 
found in.possession or control of other property on another occasion 
nor did he receive other stolen property within the year preceding 
the offense. Similarly, he was neither a dealer in this type of 
goods nor was he a pawnbroker. Therefore, Mr. Belt must have known 
or believed the property he bought was stolen for the convictions to 
stand. 
Testimony adduced at trial indicated property could be 
traced through NCIC checks by the police as long as serial numbers 
remained on the property (T. 87, 106, 117). Mr. Belt knew this 
because he expressed concern over Illsley's having even removed the 
serial number from the box (T. 106). When Illsley tried to press 
- 21 -
Mr, Belt by asking him what his preference would be regarding 
removal of warranty cards and serial numbers and by telling Mr. Belt 
his other customers had various preferences regarding these things, 
Mr. Belt replied he had no preference (T.38). If Mr. Belt had 
knowledge or belief the goods were stolen, it would be logical for 
him to want the serial numbers and warranty cards removed. Illsley 
had only removed the serial number and store identification from one 
of the three VCRs Mr. Belt purchased (T. 38). Mr. Belt did nothing 
to remove the serial numbers from the remaining items because he 
believed the items were not stolen (T. 196). 
Although Illsley told Mr. Belt the value of one of the 
VCRs was $700 he never mentioned the value of the other two VCRs 
(T. 37). There was no testimony to indicate Mr. Belt believed the 
property was stolen. Although Illsley denied having told Mr. Belt 
the property was "off the dock," Mr. Belt testified Illsley 
repeatedly told him the store identification and serial numbers were 
simply removed so the items could not be exchanged for full refund 
(T. 193) and further that the property was "off the dock" (T. 199, 
200, 202, 206). Mr. Belt also testified that when Illsley asked him 
if there were anything else he might want from the electronics dock, 
Mr. Belt indicated he would like a VCR camera if one became 
available through overage (T. 198-200, 204). 
Likewise, when Mr. Belt bought the nineteen inch 
television from Illsley for $100, he had no knowledge or belief the 
set was stolen. Although he did pay less then the represented 
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market value for the television (T. 51-52), Illsley had told him 
previously "There wouldn't ever — wouldn't be any heat on any of 
this stuff . . . . [T]here wouldn't be any heat ever on anything" 
(T. 40). Illsley also denied having "boosted" the property 
(T. 100), and although the term carried slightly different meanings 
to the two men, Mr. Belt thought it meant stolen (T. 60, 101, 206). 
Even though Illsley acted "screwy and squirrelly" 
according to Mr. Belt, and Mr. Belt did not want to be told if 
anything were wrong, Mr. Belt thought he could rely on Illsley's 
representation that the goods were "off the dock" (T. 199, 200, 
206). Mr. Belt believed he was buying items at low prices and only 
sold them for the same prices (T. 206). 
One of the televisions which Mr. Belt purchased from 
Illsley and which he then resold to Mr. Wheeler was checked by the 
Lehi police and by an individual officer who testified at trial and 
found not to be listed as stolen (T. 146, 153, 196). This provided 
further assurance to Mr. Belt Illsley was not selling him stolen 
property. Mr. Belt had no reason to believe the rest of the 
property would have been any different. Mr. Belt had additional 
grounds to believe he was operating in a legitimate fashion because 
he had "checked out" Illsley through his friend Galen (T. 39). 
Therefore, under the standard set forth in State v. 
Petree, reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt 
Mr. Belt committed the crimes of Theft by Receiving for which he was 
convicted in Counts III and IV. His convictions ought to be 
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reversed because the State failed to prove he either knew or 
believed the three VCRs or the nineteen inch television were stolen. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant seeks 
reversal of his convictions and remand of his case to the District 
Court for dismissal of the charges or in the alternative a new trial 
DATED this ^p day of August, 1988. 
I feg^v . 
TNN R . BROWN 
attorney for Appellant 
<?-. "7 
/""EliIZApETH A. BtMMAN 
Attorney for 'A^pellant 
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plus the original of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, this , j % day of August, 1988, and four copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
- ^ ^ — 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this^j^C 
day of August, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM A 
LYNN R. BROWN (0460) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER.ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNN LLOYD BELT., 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO RELY 
ON DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT 
and NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. CR86-1378 
Judge KENNETH RIGTRUP 
The defendant, LYNN LLOYD BELT, by and through his attorne; 
of record, LYNN R. BROWN, herein gives notice of the defendant's 
intent to rely on the defense of entrapment in the above-entitled 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S76-2-303 (1953 as amended). 
DATED this / / day of May, 1987. 
. BROWN IYNN R, 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND^THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on the 
day of Mayr 1987 at the hour of .m. before the Honorable 
KENNETH RIGTRUP/ Judgef Third District Court. Please govern 
yourselves accordingly. 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Notice of Intent to Rely 
on Defense of Entrapment and Notice of Hearing to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's/ Office, 231 East Fourth South/ Salt Lake City/ 
Utah 84111/ this day of May, 1987. 
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